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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 The Commonwealth appeals the order of the District 
Court granting David Copenhefer habeas relief from his 
sentence of death, and Copenhefer cross-appeals the District 
Court’s denial of habeas relief with respect to his conviction.  
We will reverse to the extent that the District Court vacated 
Copenhefer’s sentence of death, and affirm to the extent that 
it otherwise denied Copenhefer relief.   
I.  Introduction 
 
 In March 1989, David Copenhefer was convicted in 
the Court of Common Pleas, Erie County, Pennsylvania, of 
first-degree murder, kidnapping, unlawful restraint, attempted 
robbery, attempted theft by extortion, and terroristic threats.  
The penalty phase began shortly thereafter, with the jury 
finding, as to the murder conviction, two aggravating 
circumstances and no mitigating circumstances.  Based on the 
jury’s finding, a sentence of death was mandatory under 
Pennsylvania law.  At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the 
court imposed the death sentence fixed by the jury, and 
consecutive sentences totaling twenty to forty years on the 
remaining counts.  On appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania affirmed the conviction and sentence.  
Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 587 A.2d 1353, 1354-55 (Pa. 
1991).  Copenhefer then filed a petition pursuant to 
II. Procedural History 
Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).  The trial 
court denied the petition, and the Supreme Court again 
affirmed.  Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 719 A.2d 242 (Pa. 
1998).   
 
 In December 1999, Copenhefer filed a petition 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  He withdrew 
a second PCRA petition after the Commonwealth agreed to 
waive the exhaustion of state court remedies with respect to 
the claims in his § 2254 petition, and a third PCRA petition 
was dismissed as untimely.   
 
 The Magistrate Judge, in an extensive Report and 
Recommendation (App. 42-157), recommended denying 
relief with respect to the conviction, but granting relief from 
the sentence of death on the ground that the trial court failed 
to instruct the jury that it was required to find that 
Copenhefer’s lack of a prior criminal record constituted a 
mitigating circumstance.  The District Court, finding the 
objections of the parties to be without merit, adopted the 
Report and Recommendation as the Opinion of the Court, 
vacated Copenhefer’s sentence of death, and denied relief 
with respect to his conviction.  Both parties appealed.  We 
granted Copenhefer a certificate of appealability with respect 
to his claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance 
by failing to challenge the Commonwealth’s theory that the 
victim lingered before dying and his claim that the 
Commonwealth exercised peremptory strikes to remove 
female jurors in violation of J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 
(1994).1   
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
2254, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
                                              
1 The case was first argued before us in June 2005, following 
which we stayed the appeal pending the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on Copenhefer’s appeal from 
the dismissal of his third PCRA petition.  In December 2007, 
that dismissal was affirmed.  Commonwealth v. Copenhefer, 
941 A.2d 646 (Pa. 2007).  We ordered supplemental briefing 
and we again heard argument prior to rendering this decision.   
§§ 1291 and 2253.  Because the District Court did not hold an 
evidentiary hearing, our review of its legal conclusions is 
plenary.  Duncan v. Morton, 256 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 
2001).  Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et. seq., habeas 
relief cannot be granted on a claim that was adjudicated on 
the merits in state court unless the adjudication resulted in a 
decision that was either “contrary to, or involved an 
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or 
“was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in 
light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”  
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).  If the state court did not reach the 
merits of a claim, these deferential standards do not apply.  
Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 718 (3d Cir. 2004).  
 
 In affirming the conviction and sentence on direct 
appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania accurately 
summarized the complicated facts of the kidnapping/murder 
scheme now before us, and the overwhelming evidence that 
supported the verdict: 
IV. Factual Background 
 
On June 16, 1988, Sally Weiner received a 
telephone call purportedly from a 
congressman’s office asking that she meet with 
the caller to discuss arrangements for the 
presentation of a civic award to her husband.  
The next day, around noon, she drove to the 
agreed meeting place, parked her car, and was 
never seen again alive.  Several hours later, her 
husband, Harry, manager of the Corry office of 
Pennbank, received a telephone call playing a 
recorded message from his wife telling him she 
had been kidnapped and that the kidnapper 
demanded ransom money from the bank.  Mr. 
Weiner was directed to retrieve a duffel bag 
from the parking lot outside his bank; the bag 
contained additional threats and instructions.  
Mr. Weiner called a vice president of the bank, 
as well as the bank’s security office, local 
police, state police, and the FBI.  Mr. Weiner 
never received the additional radio instructions 
necessary to follow the directions contained in 
the duffel bag and therefore did not comply 
with the kidnapper’s demands. 
 
Sally Weiner’s body was discovered two days 
later on June 19, 1988, in a rural area north of 
her home.  She had died as the result of a 
gunshot wound to the back of her head. 
 
Initial investigations by the FBI, state police, 
and local police resulted in the discovery of a 
series of computer-generated notes and 
instructions, each one leading to another, which 
had been concealed at various hiding places in 
and around Corry, Pennsylvania.  The 
investigation also produced several possible 
suspects, including appellant, David 
Copenhefer, who owned a nearby bookstore, 
had had unproductive transactions with Mr. 
Weiner’s bank, and apparently had bad personal 
relations with the Weiners. 
 
An examination of trash discarded from 
appellant’s store revealed drafts of the ransom 
note and directions.  Subsequent search 
warrants resulted in seizure of incredibly 
comprehensive evidence against appellant.  This 
included evidence tying appellant’s fingerprints, 
computer, weapons and ammunition, clothing, 
automobile, and materials from his home and 
office to the victim or the murder site. 
 
His fingerprints appeared on the original 
ransom note and on some of the hidden notes.  
Police discovered rough drafts of the ransom 
note, a map of the hidden notes, as well as the 
notes and directions themselves in apellant’s 
handwriting, some of which bore his 
fingerprints.  Appellant had a collection of 
guns, including two which might have fired the 
fatal bullet. He also had glazier ammunition, a 
nonstandard composition designed to fragment 
on impact so that after entering a body it will 
not exit and injure another person, of the type 
used to murder Mrs. Weiner.  A metal rod from 
his home had been used to secure one of the 
hidden notes.  Crepe paper torn from a roll at 
his store had been used to help secure another 
note.  Human female skin tissue was found on 
his clothing.  Tread marks matching appellant’s 
automobile tires were found at one hiding place 
and at the murder scene.  Finally, appellant’s 
computer contained a series of drafts and 
amendments of the texts of the phone call to 
Mrs. Weiner on Thursday, the phone call to Mr. 
Weiner on Friday, the ransom note, the series of 
hidden notes, and a twenty-two point plan for 
the entire kidnapping scheme. 
 
Copenhefer, 587 A.2d at 1354-55.   
A.  
V.  Discussion 
 Adopting the Report and Recommendation of the 
Magistrate Judge, the District Court concluded that the 
stipulated fact that Copenhefer had no prior criminal record 
constituted a mitigating circumstance as a matter of law, and 
the failure of the trial court to so instruct the jury and the jury 
to find it as such violated the Eighth Amendment.  The 
District Court vacated the sentence of death, and the 
Commonwealth appeals.  We will reverse.   
The Commonwealth’s Appeal 
 
   At the outset, we set forth the rather extensive 
background of what brings us to this point.  At the start of the 
penalty phase, the trial court gave preliminary instructions to 
the jury with respect to aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances, describing in a general sense what they are—
those things, for example, about the murder and the murderer 
that make the case more terrible or less terrible and more or 
less deserving of the death penalty—and also those specific 
aggravating and mitigating circumstances at issue in this case 
that are listed in the Pennsylvania Sentencing Code.  As 
relevant here, “[m]itigating circumstances spelled out in the 
Statute ,” the court told the jury, “would be when the killer 
has no significant history of prior criminal convictions.”  
App. 4456; see 42 Pa. C.S. § 9711(e)(1) (“mitigating 
circumstances shall include . . . [that] the defendant has no 
significant history of prior criminal convictions.”).  Also, the 
jury was told, it may consider “any other evidence of 
mitigation concerning the character and record of the 
defendant and the circumstances of the offense.”  Id.  Defense 
counsel and the Commonwealth then orally advised the jury 
that they had entered into a stipulation that Copenhefer had 
no prior criminal convictions.   
 
 Mrs. Copenhefer and the Copenhefers’ son took the 
stand and testified as to their relationships with Copenhefer 
and his involvement in the church and community.  Counsel 
thereafter gave their closing arguments, with defense counsel 
arguing that several mitigating circumstances had been 
established: Copenhefer’s relationship with his son, his 
relationship with his wife, that he did not abuse drugs or 
alcohol, that he had never physically abused his wife, the 
importance of religion to him, his intelligence and ability to 
assist other inmates, that he helped his parents with their meat 
business, his good behavior during trial, and the value of his 
life to his family.  With respect to the lack of a criminal 
record, counsel argued:   
 
Now, with regards to the one mitigating 
circumstance, which we’ve already referred to, 
the fact that he has no prior convictions, [the 
prosecutor] stood up and stipulated to that, and I 
suggest to you that speaks for itself.  In other 
words, we have established that clearly that 
mitigating circumstance exists.  And that, 
therefore, you should take that directly into 
consideration in making your determinations. 
 
App. 4471.  Relying on the evidence presented at trial, the 
Commonwealth sought to establish the aggravating factors 
that Mrs. Weiner was held for ransom and the murder was 
committed during the course of a felony.  See 42 Pa. C.S. 
§ 9711(d)(3) &(6).   
 
 Following the closing arguments of counsel and in 
anticipation of the final instructions it would give the jury, the 
trial court discussed with counsel whether it should or should 
not direct the jury to find as a matter of law that the stipulated 
fact that Copenhefer had no prior record was a mitigating 
circumstance.  The Commonwealth argued that the weight of 
the fact that Copenhefer had no prior record, i.e. whether that 
fact rose to the level of a mitigating circumstance, remained 
for the jury to decide—the stipulation that there was no prior 
record was not, it was argued, a stipulation that no prior 
record constituted a mitigating circumstance.  Defense 
counsel argued that whatever the weight of the fact of no 
prior record, it was a proven mitigating circumstance by 
virtue of the stipulation.  The trial court agreed with the 
Commonwealth, and proceeded to give its final instructions to 
the jury, clearly and thoroughly explaining, among other 
things, what, if proven in accordance with the appropriate 
standard of proof, would constitute aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances including, as relevant here, “the 
following matters” under the Sentencing Code:  “First, the 
defendant has no significant history of prior criminal 
convictions; and, second, any other evidence of mitigation 
concerning the character and record of the defendant and the 
circumstances of the offense.”  App. 4507.  There were no 
objections to the instructions, nor any suggestions for 
corrections or additions.   
 
 We quote at some length from the trial court’s final 
instructions, and particularly its thorough explanation of 
mitigating circumstances, to provide context for the legal 
analysis to which we will shortly turn our attention.   
 
 [A] mitigating circumstance may arise 
from any of the diverse frailties of mankind.  
Mitigating circumstances are any facts relating 
to the defendant’s character, education, 
environment, mentality, life and background, or 
any aspect of the crime itself which may be 
considered extenuating, or as reducing his 
moral culpability, or making him less deserving 
of the extreme punishment of death.  You may 
consider as mitigating circumstances any 
circumstance which tends to justify the penalty 
of life imprisonment.   
 
*     *     * 
 
 In this case, under the Sentencing Code, 
the following matters, if proven to your 
satisfaction by a preponderance of the evidence, 
can be mitigating circumstances:   
 
 First, the defendant has no significant 
history of prior criminal convictions; and, 
second, any other evidence of mitigation 
concerning the character and record of the 
defendant and the circumstances of the offense.   
 
*     *     * 
 
 [E]ach of you is free to regard a 
particular mitigating circumstance as present 
despite what other jurors may believe.  This 
difference treatment of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances is one of the law’s 
safeguards against unjust death sentences.  It 
gives a defendant the full benefit of any 
mitigating circumstances.   
*     *     * 
 
 You must consider all evidence of 
mitigation.  The weight which you give to a 
particular mitigating circumstance is a matter 
for your moral, factual, and legal judgment.  
However, you may not refuse to consider any 
evidence in mitigation which has been proven 
to your satisfaction by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  I charge you that you must consider 
the mitigating circumstances offered by the 
defendant.  This does not mean that you must 
accept them as mitigating circumstances, for 
you shall only do that if one or more of you 
determines that those mitigating circumstances 
have been proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence.   
 
 The list of mitigating circumstances 
offered cannot limit your deliberations, since 
you are free to consider any aspect of the crime 
or of the character of the defendant as 
mitigating in your sole discretion.   
 
App. 4505, 4507-10. 
 The jury commenced its deliberations, reaching its 
verdict a few hours later.  Prior to the announcement of the 
verdict, the trial court reviewed the verdict form, and noted 
that it had not been filled out correctly, twice handing it back 
to the foreman for correction.  When the form was initially 
reviewed, the words “first offense” had been written in by the 
jury in response to the question of whether a mitigating 
circumstance had been found by one or more of the jurors.  
The form was, however, missing a check mark in the box 
indicating whether the aggravating circumstances 
unanimously found outweighed that one mitigating 
circumstance, and the form was, therefore, returned to the 
foreman.  The foreman crossed out “first offense,” but 
mistakenly placed the check mark in the “weighing” box 
where, given the crossout indicating that no mitigating 
circumstance had been found, it should not have been placed. 
The form was again corrected and, as finally returned, clearly 
showed, and the foreman announced, that the jury found the 
sentence to be death on the basis that there was at least one 
aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance.  
Each juror, when polled, agreed.  The verdict mandated a 
sentence of death under 42 Pa. C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv) (“the 
verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously 
finds at least one aggravating circumstance specified in 
subsection (d) and no mitigating circumstance.”).   
 
 Relying only on Pennsylvania caselaw and statutes, 
Copenhefer argued on direct appeal that the trial court erred 
by refusing to instruct the jury that his lack of a prior record 
was a mitigating circumstance as a matter of law.  However, 
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found: 
 
The verdict slip . . . indicates clearly that the 
jury did consider evidence of mitigation--viz., 
that appellant had no significant history of prior 
criminal convictions.  Any apparent confusion 
in the proceedings has to do with filling out the 
verdict slip, and the colloquy which occurred 
when the jury returned its verdict did not clarify 
the process.  But it is readily apparent that the 
jury did follow the court’s instructions in 
considering appellant’s lack of a prior record 
during its deliberations. 
 
Copenhefer, 587 A.2d at 1360.  The Court addressed the issue 
as a matter of state law, and concluded that the sentence was 
not the product of passion, prejudice, or any arbitrary factor. 
 
 In Commonwealth v. Rizzuto, 777 A.2d 1069 (Pa. 
2001), however, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 
overruled its decision in Copenhefer and held that where the 
absence of prior convictions is not in dispute, the jury has no 
discretion not to find that absence as a mitigating 
circumstance.  The Court noted that 
 
[i]f we would grant the jury discretion to ignore 
stipulations of fact, we would be granting the 
right to arrive at a sentencing verdict in an 
arbitrary and capricious fashion.  Such a 
conclusion would undercut the very purpose of 
the death penalty sentencing scheme as 
developed by our General Assembly.  A 
sentence of death cannot be “the product of 
passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.”  
42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(3)(i). 
 
Id. at 1089.  Copenhefer filed a third PCRA petition and 
raised a state law claim based on Rizzuto, a petition denied as 
untimely.  The Court affirmed the denial, stating: “[W]e used 
the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ language in Rizzuto to indicate 
the danger of ‘undercut[ting] the very purpose of the death 
penalty sentencing scheme as developed by our General 
Assembly.’ We did not expressly discuss the United States 
Constitution or any constitutional rights.”  Commonwealth v. 
Copenhefer, 941 A.2d 646, 650 n.7. (Pa. 2007) (citation 
omitted).  Thus, Copenhefer’s third PCRA petition did not fit 
into the exception to the PCRA’s limitations period for newly 
created, retroactively applied constitutional  
rights.  Id. at 650. 2
                                              
2 In addressing the District Court’s jurisdiction over the 
sentencing claim, Copenhefer conceded, “Rizzuto does not 
contain any discussion of the Eighth Amendment issues 
raised in Claim III of the petition.” Pet. Mem. Addressing 
Jurisdiction at 6 (emphasis in original).     
  
 The District Court reviewed the Eighth Amendment 
claim de novo after concluding that on direct appeal the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had not even mentioned any 
such claim, much less decided one on the merits.  We agree 
with the District Court that review of this claim is de novo 
given that the only claim on direct appeal was based solely on 
state law.  The federal claim was not, however, defaulted 
because the Commonwealth waived exhaustion. 
 
 The Commonwealth argues that the jury initially found 
the mitigating circumstance of Copenhefer’s lack of a prior 
record when it wrote on the verdict form, though later crossed 
out, “first offense,” and that any confusion occurred only 
when the trial court tried to clarify the form.  Whatever merit 
there may be to that argument and whether confusion may 
have preceded the jury’s ultimate announcement that no 
mitigating circumstance was found, we are bound by that 
finding.  Even on that understanding, however, there was no 
constitutional error.   
 
 Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 272-73 (1998), 
which held that the Eighth Amendment does not require a 
capital jury to be instructed on the concept of mitigating 
evidence generally or on particular statutory mitigating 
factors, resolves the issue before us.  In Buchanan, the jury 
was instructed that if it found that petitioner’s conduct in 
committing the murders was outrageously vile, it could 
sentence him to death.  If, however, it believed from all the 
evidence that the death penalty was not justified, it could 
sentence him to life imprisonment.  Petitioner requested 
additional instructions on four mitigating factors that were 
specifically listed in the Virginia Code.  The trial court 
refused to give the instructions.  On its verdict form, the jury 
indicated that it had considered the evidence in mitigation and 
unanimously fixed the penalty at death.   
 
 Petitioner argued to the Supreme Court that the Eighth 
Amendment required the trial court to “instruct the jury on its 
obligation and authority to consider mitigating evidence, and 
on particular mitigating factors deemed relevant by the State.”  
Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 275.  The Supreme Court rejected the 
argument, observing that, “[n]o such rule has ever been 
adopted by this Court.”  Id.   It explained that, in the selection 
phase of the capital sentencing process, it has “emphasized 
the need for a broad inquiry into all relevant mitigating 
evidence to allow an individualized determination,” and “the 
sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may 
not refuse to consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating 
evidence.”  Id.  Its “consistent concern” has been that the jury 
not be precluded from being able to give effect to mitigating 
evidence—it has “never gone further and held that the state 
must affirmatively structure in a particular way the manner in 
which juries consider mitigating evidence.”  Id. at 276.  The 
Court emphasized that the standard was “whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged 
instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of 
constitutionally relevant evidence.”  Id. (quoting Boyde v. 
California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)).   
 
 Copenhefer does not argue, nor could he credibly do 
so, that the jury was not given extensive instructions on the 
concept of mitigating evidence generally or that it was not 
instructed on the particular statutory mitigating circumstance 
at issue here—his lack of a prior record; indeed, one could 
well make the case that that is game, set, and match given the 
holding of Buchanan.  Rather, Copenhefer argues only that 
the jury should have been instructed to find that the stipulated 
fact that he had no prior record was, as a matter of law, a 
mitigating circumstance.3
 In support of his argument, Copenhefer cites Eddings 
   
 
                                              
3 In Buchanan, the Virginia Code at issue stated that 
mitigating circumstances “may include” the lack of a 
significant criminal history.  Here, the Pennsylvania Code 
uses the mandatory language “shall include.”  This difference 
in state law is, of course, not dispositive as to the 
constitutional issue before us.   
v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and Penry v. Lynaugh, 
492 U.S. 302 (1989), which require the jury to “give effect 
to” the mitigating evidence, and he emphasizes the following 
language from Penry:  “Eddings makes clear that it is not 
enough simply to allow the defendant to present mitigating 
evidence to the sentencer.  The sentencer must also be able to 
consider and give effect to that evidence in imposing 
sentence.”  Penry, 492 U.S. at 319.  As did the District Court, 
Copenhefer reads the language “give effect to” in this passage 
as being modified only by “must”—“[t]he sentencer must 
also [] give effect to that evidence in imposing sentence,” i.e., 
must find it to be a mitigating circumstance.  We conclude, 
however, that the phrase “be able to” modifies “give effect 
to” as well as “consider,” i.e., “[t]he sentencer must also be 
able to consider and [be able to] give effect to that evidence 
in imposing sentence.”  The facts of Penry and Eddings and, 
of course, the facts and holding of Buchanan clearly support 
our conclusion.   
 
 We but briefly address Penry and Eddings and then 
only to show how distinguishable they are on the facts from 
the case at hand.  In Eddings, the trial court, as the sentencer, 
found that it could consider the age of the capital defendant as 
a mitigating factor but determined that, as a matter of law, it 
could not consider his family history.  Similarly, the state 
appellate court appeared to consider evidence as mitigating 
only when it would support a legal excuse from liability.  The 
Supreme Court found that these restrictions violated Lockett 
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978):  
 
Just as the state may not by statute preclude the 
sentencer from considering any mitigating 
factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to 
consider, as a matter of law, any relevant 
mitigating evidence.  In this instance, it was as 
if the trial judge had instructed a jury to 
disregard the mitigating evidence Eddings 
proffered on his behalf.  The sentencer, and the 
Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may 
determine the weight to be given relevant 
mitigating evidence.  But they may not give it 
no weight by excluding such evidence from 
their consideration. 
 
Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113-14. (emphasis in original).  Here, 
the jury was not instructed to disregard Copenhefer=s lack of a 
prior record or to give it no weight—indeed, quite the 
contrary was instructed—and there is no evidence that the 
jury refused to consider it.4
                                              
4 That the jury initially wrote down “first offense” instead of 
“no significant history of prior criminal convictions” indicates 
that it heard and remembered the stipulation and the defense 
argument that Copenhefer had no prior convictions (as 
opposed to some insignificant ones); notably, it did not just 
copy what was listed on the verdict form as one of the 
potential mitigating circumstances. 
  Although the jury did not 
ultimately find a mitigating circumstance, the record strongly 
suggests that it considered the mitigating evidence and 
decided that none of that evidence was qualitatively sufficient 
to constitute a mitigating circumstance.   
 
 In Penry, the jury was given three special questions, 
and if it answered all of them in the affirmative, the trial court 
was required to sentence the defendant to death.  The 
questions concerned whether the conduct of the defendant 
was deliberate, whether he posed a continuing threat to 
society, and whether his conduct was an unreasonable 
response to provocation by the victim.  The Supreme Court 
noted that “[t]he jury was never instructed that it could 
consider the evidence offered by Penry as mitigating evidence 
and that it could give mitigating effect to that evidence in 
imposing sentence,” Penry, 492 U.S. at 320, and determined 
that the jury, confined to the three questions posed to it, had 
not been empowered to give effect to Penry’s mitigating 
evidence in answering the special questions.   
 
In the absence of jury instructions defining 
“deliberately” in a way that would clearly direct 
the jury to consider fully Penry’s mitigating 
evidence as it bears on his personal culpability, 
we cannot be sure that the jury was able to give 
effect to the mitigating evidence of Penry’s 
mental retardation and history of abuse in 
answering the first special issue.  
 
Id. at 323.  The Court then discussed the other two special 
questions and concluded that “a reasonable juror could well 
have believed that there was no vehicle for expressing the 
view that Penry did not deserve to be sentenced to death 
based upon his mitigating evidence.”  Id. at 326.  Aside from 
its facts, the lesson of Penry is that the jury must be able to 
give effect to the mitigating evidence; it is not required to do 
so.   
 
 Here, as in Buchanan, the jury was not only not 
precluded from considering Copenhefer’s lack of a prior 
record or any other mitigating evidence, but it was instructed 
that it must consider the mitigating evidence, and no 
constraint was placed on the manner in which it could give 
effect to that evidence.  Had the jury been of the view that, 
based on the mitigating evidence, Copenhefer did not deserve 
to be sentenced to death, it was fully empowered to find that 
his lack of record, or any other mitigating evidence presented, 
constituted a mitigating circumstance, weigh that 
circumstance or those circumstances against the aggravating 
circumstances, and sentence him to life imprisonment.  But in 
no way was the evidence “exclu[ded] from meaningful 
consideration by the jury.”  Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 
U.S. 233, 250 (2007).  To the contrary, Copenhefer’s jury was 
“permitted to give that evidence meaningful, mitigating effect 
in imposing the ultimate sentence.”  Id. at 260.  And, as the 
Supreme Court reiterated in Buchanan, “complete jury 
discretion is constitutionally permissible.”  522 U.S. at 276 
(citation omitted).     
 
 Parenthetically, it is difficult for us to imagine that the 
outcome in this case would have been different even if the 
jury had been specifically instructed to find that Copenhefer’s 
lack of a prior record was a mitigating circumstance.  As it 
was, the jury was instructed that each juror was free to find 
for himself or herself that a mitigating circumstance was 
present despite what the other jurors believed.  Thus, the 
verdict rendered by Copenhefer’s jury indicates that not a 
single juror believed that his lack of a prior record—or, 
indeed, any of the many potential mitigating factors argued 
by defense counsel—mitigated the painstakingly planned 
murder about which the jury heard at trial.   
 
 For the reasons we have stated, we simply cannot 
conclude that Copenhefer has established any likelihood, 
much less a reasonable likelihood, that the jury applied the 
instructions—or, more precisely, as in Buchanan, the lack of 
an instruction—in a way that violated the Eighth Amendment.  
Because the District Court erred in finding an Eighth 
Amendment violation, we will reverse its order vacating the 




 We granted a certificate of appealability on 
Copenhefer’s claim that his trial counsel provided 
constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to call an 
expert witness to rebut the Commonwealth’s evidence that 
Mrs. Weiner did not die immediately upon being shot but, 
rather, “lingered” before dying.  The District Court rejected 
that claim.  We do so as well.   
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
 
 Mrs. Weiner was last seen early on a Friday afternoon 
in June 1988.  Dr. Antonio I. German, a clinical pathologist, 
testified on behalf of the Commonwealth that she had died at 
some point between midnight on Friday and 2 p.m. on 
Saturday.  He also testified that it was possible that her brain 
stem was not completely destroyed by the gunshot and that it 
was probable that she lingered in a coma before dying.  Dr. K. 
C. Kim, a forensic entomologist, testified—also for the 
Commonwealth—that, based on insect activity on the body, 
Mrs. Weiner died between 5 p.m. and 8 p.m. on Friday.  
Detective Mark Watts testified for the Commonwealth, as 
well, relating a conversation he had with Copenhefer not long 
before trial in which Copenhefer told him that he 
demonstrated to other inmates how to shoot a person in the 
head without severing the medulla so that the person does not 
die right away.  During closing arguments, the 
Commonwealth cited the testimony of both Dr. German and 
Dr. Kim to argue that Copenhefer shot Mrs. Weiner on Friday 
afternoon and she lingered before dying between 5 p.m. and 8 
p.m.  In his closing, Copenhefer’s trial counsel argued that 
Copenhefer had an alibi starting at 5 p.m., when he returned 
to his bookstore. 
 
 Copenhefer raised this ineffectiveness claim in his first 
PCRA petition.  At the PCRA hearing, his trial counsel 
testified that he had reviewed the medical records in the case 
and read quite a bit about forensic pathology, time of death, 
and how fruit flies grow.  He stated that he tried to show at 
trial that Dr. Kim’s testimony was inaccurate, and explained 
that Dr. German’s testimony was beneficial to the defense 
because he placed the time of death on Saturday, when 
Copenhefer had an alibi.  Given that, counsel stated, there 
was no reason, particularly in the midst of trial, to find a 
defense expert.  Indeed, it was during trial when Dr. German 
first mentioned the possibility that Mrs. Weiner lingered 
before dying, and there does not appear to be any evidence 
that counsel was, or should have been, aware before trial that 
Dr. German would testify about this theory.  Counsel 
explained that 
 
all of the reports we had from him indicated that 
the time of death was at a certain period of time 
and that that was consistent with the shooting.  
That being the case, [Dr. German’s] testimony 
was beneficial to the defense because it was 
consistent with when Mr. Copenhefer could not 
have done what he is accused of doing.  It was 
not until [Dr. German] indicated that it’s 
possible that she could have lingered, and that 
was during his trial testimony, as I recall, and 
not prior to that.  
 
Supp. App. at 141.  Copenhefer presented the testimony of 
Dr. Cyril Wecht, a forensic pathologist, who testified that the 
medulla was not intact and that Mrs. Weiner died within a 
minute or two of being shot.  
 
 The PCRA court noted that trial counsel testified he 
was satisfied with Dr. German’s time of death testimony.  
Had counsel challenged the time of death, the court stated, he 
would have opened up further attacks on Copenhefer’s 
credibility concerning his whereabouts.  The court concluded 
that this was a valid strategy and that counsel did not perform 
unreasonably.  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also 
noted trial counsel’s satisfaction with Dr. German’s testimony 
as to the time of death.  With respect to the lingering death 
theory, the Court concluded that Copenhefer claimed only 
that his counsel performed unreasonably by failing to call an 
expert to “critically evaluate,” in rebuttal, the 
Commonwealth’s expert testimony, and that it would not 
consider counsel ineffective for failing to do so.  Copenhefer, 
719 A.2d at 254 n.12.  
 
 To succeed on his claim of ineffectiveness, 
Copenhefer was required to demonstrate that (1) counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness, and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s error, the result would have been different.  
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (citing 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984)).  As 
to the first prong, there is a strong presumption that counsel’s 
conduct was reasonable.  Id.   
 
 The Report and Recommendation, adopted by the 
District Court, found reasonable the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania’s conclusion that trial counsel’s performance 
was not deficient.  It noted that the PCRA testimony showed 
that counsel had sound reasons for not challenging Dr. 
German’s testimony that Mrs. Weiner might have lingered 
before dying, and that counsel believed that Dr. German’s 
testimony was beneficial to Copenhefer.  It also concluded 
that, even if counsel’s performance was deficient, Copenhefer 
could not show prejudice.  Noting that uncontradicted 
evidence proved that Copenhefer killed Mrs. Weiner whether 
or not she lingered before dying, it concluded that even if trial 
counsel had challenged the theory that Mrs. Weiner lingered 
before dying, the result of the trial would have been the same. 
 
 We conclude that Copenhefer simply cannot show 
prejudice from this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.  
We need not, therefore, determine whether trial counsel 
performed unreasonably by failing to anticipate that the 
Commonwealth would use the lingering death theory of one 
expert, Dr. German, while rejecting that expert’s time of 
death, and also use the time of death of another expert, Dr. 
Kim, or that counsel failed, in the middle of a four-week trial, 
to find an expert to rebut the belatedly advanced “lingering 
death” theory.   
 
 Because the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did not 
address the prejudice prong of the Strickland test, the District 
Court properly reviewed the issue de novo.  Holloway, 355 
F.3d at 718.  To establish prejudice, Copenhefer was required 
to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, 
the result would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
687-96 (1984).  “A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 
694.  In light of the overwhelming evidence against 
Copenhefer, we agree with the District Court that he cannot 
show he was prejudiced. 
 
 Even if trial counsel had presented expert rebuttal 
testimony suggesting that it was not possible that Mrs. 
Weiner lingered before dying, the jury also had before it Dr. 
German’s testimony to the contrary.  Moreover, and as noted 
by the District Court, even if Mrs. Weiner did not linger 
before dying, it was still possible for Copenhefer to have shot 
her around 5 p.m. and then to have driven to his bookstore, 
arriving sometime after 5 p.m.  Citing the testimony of three 
witnesses, Copenhefer argues that the lingering death theory 
was important because he had an alibi from 5 p.m. on and the 
experts put the earliest time of death at 5 p.m.  But the 
testimony of these three witnesses does not, in fact, support a 
5 p.m. alibi.  When asked when she saw Copenhefer that 
afternoon, his wife testified “I can’t give an exact time.  
Sometime between 5:00 and 6:00.”  App. 3862.  When asked 
a similar question, she said “5:30, something like that.”  Id. at 
3865.  David Zimmer, a bank employee, testified that when 
he heard that Mrs. Weiner had been kidnapped, he left the 
bank’s Erie branch at 5 p.m. and arrived in Corry around 6:30 
or 7 p.m., and that Copenhefer was in the bookstore when he 
went by.  Trooper Johnston testified that Copenhefer was at 
the bookstore at approximately 5 p.m., but admitted that that 
was not based on personal knowledge.  Copenhefer ignores 
his own testimony that he arrived back at his bookstore 
around 5:20 p.m.   
 
  According to the 22-point plan found on his computer, 
Copenhefer intended to kidnap Mrs. Weiner, have her tape a 
message to her husband, and then kill her before leaving the 
bag with the ransom note and making the call to her husband.  
This timeline is consistent with the theory that Copenhefer 
killed Mrs. Weiner early in the afternoon and that she 
lingered before dying later that evening.  When questioned by 
the police, Copenhefer spoke openly about where he had been 
Friday evening through Sunday, but he refused to discuss his 
whereabouts on Friday afternoon.  Moreover, and perhaps 
most importantly, Copenhefer told a detective that he had 
demonstrated to other inmates how to shoot a person in the 
head without severing the medulla so that the person 
“linger[s]” before dying.  App. 3163-64.  These pieces of 
evidence all support the theory that Copenhefer shot Mrs. 
Weiner in the early afternoon and that she, indeed, lingered 
before dying, perhaps as early as 5 p.m., as Dr. Kim had 
testified. 
 
 The evidence that Copenhefer committed the 
calculated kidnapping and murder of Mrs. Weiner, and did so 
alone, was overwhelming.  The compelling evidence of guilt 
included the documents recovered from his computer, 
including the drafts of his call to Mrs. Weiner, the recorded 
call from Mrs. Weiner to her husband, the ransom note, the 
notes at the drop sites, and the 22-point plan.  An FBI 
metallurgist testified that the rods found at the drop sites were 
made within minutes of those found in Copenhefer’s 
backyard.  The tears on the crepe paper found at a drop site 
matched the tear pattern on the roll found in his store.  
Copenhefer’s fingerprints were found on notes at the drop 
sites, and a note in his wallet matched up with the plan on his 
computer. 
 
 We cannot say that Copenhefer has established any 
reasonable likelihood that the result would have been 
different even if trial counsel had been able to rebut the 
lingering-death theory.  As the Magistrate Judge aptly noted, 
“Copenhefer seeks to make time of death the only issue in 
this case.  To prove its case, the Commonwealth had to prove 
murder, not time of death.  On this point, the Commonwealth 
made out an overwhelming case.”  App. 109.  We will affirm 
the District Court’s denial of the “lingering death” claim. 
 
2.  The J.E.B. Claim
 We also granted a certificate of appealability on 
Copenhefer’s claim that the prosecution used peremptory 
. 
strikes to remove female jurors, in violation of J.E.B., 511 
U.S. 127.  Copenhefer concedes, however, that under Abu-
Jamal v. Horn, 520 F.3d 272, 284 (3d Cir. 2008), he cannot 
prevail because he is unable to show contemporaneous 
objections to the strikes that he believes violated equal 
protection, and that he simply wishes to preserve the claim for 
possible future review.  We will, nonetheless, briefly address 
his claim on the merits.  It resoundingly fails.   
 
 The J.E.B. claim was not presented to the 
Pennsylvania state courts.  The District Court, however, 
properly reviewed the claim, as the Commonwealth had 
waived exhaustion.  Because there was no adjudication on the 
merits in the state court, we, of course, are not concerned with 
an issue of AEDPA deference.  Holloway, 355 F.3d at 718.  
The District Court denied the claim because it found that 
retroactive application of J.E.B. was barred by Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), an issue we need not and do not 
reach given Copenhefer’s failure to have made even a prima 
facie showing that the Commonwealth exercised peremptory 
strikes on the basis of gender. 
 
 All relevant circumstances must be considered in 
determining whether a prima facie showing has been made.  
Holloway, 355 F.3d at 722.  In Holloway, we cited five 
generally relevant factors: “1) the number of [female] 
members in the panel; 2) the nature of the crime; 3) the 
[gender] of the defendant; 4) a pattern of strikes against 
[females]; and 5) the questions and statements during the voir 
dire.”  Id.  With respect to the first factor, Copenhefer states 
that twenty-eight of the sixty-one jurors who were 
individually questioned during voir dire were female.  He 
does not make any argument as to how the nature of the crime 
affects the analysis, nor does he point to any disparate 
questioning or treatment of female jurors.  He relies solely on 
the Commonwealth’s alleged pattern of strikes.   
 
 In the District Court, Copenhefer set forth the 
percentage of female jurors struck by the prosecution (11 out 
of 20 or 55%) and the percentage of prosecution strikes used 
to strike female jurors (11 out of 19 or 58%).  He computed 
some statistics using these numbers—there were, for 
example, 1.38 peremptory strikes of female jurors for every 
strike of a male juror—but did not explain whether and how 
these statistics were significant.  Moreover, the final 
composition of the jury was six females and nine males.  The 
three alternates were male, so there was an equal number of 
each gender on the jury that actually deliberated.  Before us, 
Copenhefer points to the striking of specific female jurors; 
however, in the District Court, he did not single out any 
female juror as being impermissibly struck. 
 
 The numbers presented by Copenhefer do not show a 
pattern of strikes on the basis of gender, nor do they raise an 
inference of discrimination.  Simply put, Copenhefer has not 
shown that “there is some reason to believe that 
discrimination might be at work.” Johnson v. Love, 40 F.3d 
658, 663 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Clemmons, 
892 F.2d 1153, 1156 (3d Cir. 1989)).  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the District Court’s denial of relief with respect to this 
claim. 
 
 With reference to the guilt phase of the trial, the 
Magistrate Judge concluded that although Copenhefer had 
raised a number of claims for relief, he had not demonstrated 
that his conviction was compromised by any federal 
constitutional violations, and that the Commonwealth had 
marshaled an overwhelming amount of evidence linking 
Copenhefer directly to the kidnapping and murder of Sally 
Weiner.  The Magistrate Judge recommended that guilt-phase 
relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be denied.  The District Court 
adopted the Report and Recommendation as to the guilt phase 
claims.   
VI. Conclusion 
 
 The Magistrate Judge then reached the penalty phase 
claims, noting, at the outset, that it is “no part of the court’s 
job to determine whether this sentencing hearing, or any state 
criminal proceeding, was ‘ideal’; the court is charged only 
with scouring the trial record for federal constitutional errors 
that had a substantial and injurious effect on the jury’s 
deliberations.”  App. 130.  Having done so, the Magistrate 
Judge found that the record disclosed but one, the one we 
have addressed at some length, and recommended relief only 
as to that claim, thus effectively recommending a denial of 
relief as to the sentencing claims that did not meet the 
requisite federal standard.  Not surprisingly, Copenhefer took 
no issue with those recommendations, and the District Court 
adopted the Report and Recommendation as to the penalty 
phase claims.  But whether decision on any remaining 
sentencing claims was implicitly denied or whether decision 
on any such claims was simply deferred, we have considered 
all of those claims, and conclude that they fail as a matter of 
law.5
                                              
5 (I) Treating Copenhefer’s factual allegations as true, 
counsel’s penalty phase investigation into Copenhefer’s 
personality disorder, paranoia, and head injury for the 
purpose of developing mitigating evidence and his 
performance at the penalty phase with reference thereto were 
not unreasonable.  Counsel retained an expert who performed 
a mitigation investigation and diagnosed Copenhefer with 
Antisocial Personality Disorder.  Counsel then made a 
strategic decision not to present that evidence.  (II) & (IX) 
Copenhefer was not entitled to a jury instruction that he was 
not eligible for parole.  Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 
154 (1994); O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997).  (III) 
Counsel did, in fact, argue for an instruction that the jury 
must find Copenhefer’s lack of a criminal record as a 
mitigating circumstance.  Counsel was not ineffective for 
failing to object to the Commonwealth’s argument that no 
mitigating evidence existed.  The Commonwealth’s actual 
argument was that there were “no true mitigating 
circumstances of merit in this particular case.”  App. 4489 
(emphasis added).  (V)  The jury did not rely on non-statutory 
aggravating factors.  See 42 Pa. C.S. § 9711(a)(2)(1989).  To 
the extent that it did, the Eighth Amendment was not violated.  
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 956 (1983); Lesko v. 
Owens, 881 F.2d 44, 57-59 (3d Cir. 1989).  (VI) The trial 
court did not err in allowing the kidnapping of the victim to 
establish both aggravating circumstances.  Jones v. United 
States, 527 U.S. 373, 398-400 (1999).  (VII) Counsel for the 
Commonwealth did not engage in misconduct in his closing 
argument.  Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986); 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896 (1983); Payne v. 
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).  (VIII) The Commonwealth 
did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).  (X) 
The Constitution does not require proportionality review, 
   
 For the reasons we have stated, we will reverse the 
order of the District Court to the extent that it granted 
Copenhefer relief from his sentence of death.  In all other 
respects, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
 
 
                                                                                                     
Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51 (1984), and Copenhefer 
has not shown that the state court did not undertake its review 
in good faith.  Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 311-12 (3d Cir. 
2001) (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 656 (1990)).  
(XI) A disagreement between experts does not establish a 
claim that false and misleading testimony has been presented.  
(XIII) Counsel was not ineffective for failing to argue at 
sentencing that Copenhefer was not the sole perpetrator of the 




Copenhefer v. Horn, et. al. 
Nos. 03-9000 & 03-9001 
 
MCKEE, Chief Judge, concurring in part, and dissenting in part 
 
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that Copenhefer’s challenge to his 
conviction is without merit.  However, for the reasons that follow, I cannot agree that the 
District Court erred in overturning the death sentence that was imposed.  
I. 
It has long been held that the Eighth Amendment bars the arbitrary imposition of 
the death penalty.  Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 421 (2004).  Because “death is 
different,”  Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (plurality opinion),  the United 
States Supreme Court “has gone to extraordinary measures to ensure that the prisoner 
sentenced to be executed is afforded process that will guarantee, as much as humanly 
possible, that the sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake.”  
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added).  Indeed, there is “a considerable history reflecting the law’s effort to develop a 
system of capital punishment at once consistent and principled but also humane and 
sensible to the uniqueness of the individual.  Since the early days of the common law, the 
legal system has struggled to accommodate these twin objectives.”  Id. at 110.   
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence therefore requires that the sentencer (as opposed 
to an appellate court) be permitted to consider any aspect of the defendant’s record or 
character as a mitigating factor, and weigh it against any aggravating factors in 
determining whether the defendant should be put to death by the state.  Id. at 117-18 
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(O’Connor, J., concurring).  The “[s]entencer [must] be given a full opportunity to 
consider mitigating circumstances in capital cases.  Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 602 
(1978).  “Equally clear is the corollary rule that the sentencer may not refuse to consider 
or be precluded from considering ‘any relevant mitigating evidence.’”  Skipper v. South 
Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986) (quoting Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114).   
The reason is clear.   “Rather than creating the risk of an unguided emotional 
response, full consideration of evidence that mitigates against the death penalty is 
essential if the jury is to give a reasoned moral response to the defendant’s background, 
character, and crime.”  Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989) abrogated on other 
grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (internal quotations omitted); see also 
Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112 (“the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth 
Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender 
and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensible part of 
the process of inflicting the penalty of death.”).  But mere “consideration” of mitigating 
evidence is insufficient to satisfy Eighth Amendment safeguards.  The jury must also be 
able to “give effect to that evidence of mitigation.”  Penry, 492 U.S. at 319.   
My colleagues quite correctly emphasize this point in discussing Penry and 
Eddings “to show how distinguishable they are on the facts from the case at hand.”  See 
Maj. Op. at 16. (“[t]he sentencer must be able to consider and [be able to] give effect to 
that evidence in imposing sentence.”) (emphasis added).  The majority’s conclusion that 
those cases, along with Buchanan v. Angelone, amount to “game, set, and match” would 
be quite difficult to refute if Copenhefer’s sole argument was that the trial court erred by 
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failing to instruct the jury on the legal effect of the stipulation that he had no prior record.  
Maj. Op. at 15; 522 U.S. 269, 272-73 (1998). 
Copenhefer’s argument, however, is not that narrow.  Accordingly, we cannot so 
readily declare that Buchanan ends our inquiry.  Copenhefer argues not only that the 
court’s failure to define “stipulation” or inform the jury of its significance 
unconstitutionally precluded the jury from giving effect to evidence of mitigation, but 
also that the jury’s failure to engage in the requisite balancing of mitigating and 
aggravating factors (because the jury found that no mitigating factors existed) resulted in 
the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  See 
Initial Brief at 14 (“Moreover, the jury’s failure to find and weigh the stipulated 
mitigating fact rendered the death sentence arbitrary and capricious.”).  This latter point 
is the issue upon which this case primarily turns and, given the record here,  it is a point 
that undermines the majority’s reliance on Buchanan.  On the contrary, under the bizarre 
circumstances of Copenhefer’s penalty hearing, Penry and Eddings require that we affirm 
the District Court’s order vacating the sentence of death, and Buchanan is not to the 
contrary. 
II. 
As the majority explains in summarizing the underlying facts of this case, the 
prosecutor entered into a stipulation with defense counsel which established that 
Copenhefer had no prior criminal history.  The court told the jury that the stipulation 
existed.  Thus, not surprisingly, defense counsel quite naturally made the following 
argument during his summation at the close of the penalty phase of the trial:  
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Now, with regards to the one mitigating circumstance, which 
we’ve already referred to, the fact that he has no prior 
convictions, [the prosecutor] stood up and stipulated to that, 
and I suggest to you that speaks for itself.  In other words, we 
have established that clearly that mitigating circumstance 
exists.  And that, therefore, you should take that directly into 
consideration in making your determinations. 
App., p. 4471; see also Maj. Op. at 8. 
However, for reasons known only to him, the prosecutor thought it appropriate to ignore 
that he had stipulated that a migrating factor existed.  After defense counsel’s closing, the 
prosecutor argued to the jury: “[Copenhefer] chose to do it on his own, in a conscious and 
deliberate and a calculated fashion, and that’s why I submit there are no true mitigating 
circumstances of merit in this particular case.”  App., p. 4489 (emphasis added).   
No doubt sensing the problems that could arise from the prosecutor’s remarks, the 
“trial court discussed [with counsel] whether it should . . . direct the jury to find as a 
matter of law that the stipulated fact Copenhefer had no prior record was a mitigating 
factor.”1
                                                 
1  It is not at all clear what a “true mitigating circumstance” or one of “merit” is since the 
mitigating factor that was stipulated to is a meritorious mitigating circumstance as a 
matter of law. It would have been appropriate to argue that that mitigating circumstance 
was outweighed by the evidence of aggravating circumstances here, but that is not what 
the prosecutor said; and it is apparent from subsequent events that that is not how the jury 
interpreted this troublesome – if not mischievous - argument. 
  See Maj. Op. at 8.  Not surprisingly, given the prosecutor’s decision to ignore 
the stipulation and argue that no mitigating circumstance “of merit” existed, defense 
counsel asked the trial court to instruct the jurors that at least one mitigating factor had 
been proven as a matter of law.  For reasons that are beyond my comprehension, the trial 
court refused.  Instead, it gave the standard charge which is quoted by the Majority.  
 5 
Although my colleagues include the court’s charge at some length in their opinion, I will 
reiterate portions of it in order to emphasize why the majority’s analysis reaches the 
wrong conclusion.2
The trial judge informed the jury a second time that “the defendant need only prove any 
mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence.”  Id. at 004509 (emphasis 
added).  The trial court also reiterated that the jury “may not refuse to consider any 
evidence in mitigation which has been proven to your satisfaction by a preponderance 
of the evidence.”  Id. (emphasis added).  Finally, the trial court told the jury to “consider 
   
As the Majority points out, the trial judge instructed the jury that it was permitted 
to consider all mitigating circumstances.  However, that was qualified by the instruction 
that Copenhefer “must prove any mitigating circumstances [sic] only by a 
preponderance of the evidence; that is, by the greater weight of the evidence.”  App., p. 
004506 (emphasis added).  At another point during the charge, the trial court instructed 
the jury: 
In this case, under the Sentencing Code, the following 
matters, if proven to your satisfaction by a preponderance of 
the evidence, can be mitigating circumstances:  First, the 
defendant has no significant history of prior criminal 
convictions; and, second, any other evidence of mitigation 
concerning the character and record of the defendant and the 
circumstances of the offense. 
App., p. 004507 (emphasis added). 
                                                 
2  In doing so, I in no way intend to suggest that the court emphasized any particular part 
of the charge through inflection or tone when it instructed the jury. Rather, as I explain 
below, I emphasize portions of the text only to highlight language that allowed the jury to 
ignore a mitigating circumstance that had been established as a matter of law. 
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the mitigating circumstances offered by the defendant.  [But the trial court clarified], 
[t]his does not mean that you must accept them as mitigating circumstances, for you shall 
only do that if one or more of you determines that those mitigating circumstances have 
been proven by a preponderance of the evidence.”  Id. (emphasis added).3
Placed against this background and considered in the context required by this 
record,  Buchanan, Penry and Eddings mandate that we uphold the District Court’s 
thoughtful opinion and affirm its order vacating Copenhefer’s sentence.  In Buchanan, 
the Supreme Court held that the trial court’s failure to specifically inform the jury of 
certain statutorily prescribed mitigating circumstances did not invalidate the defendant’s 
death sentence.  As my colleagues explain, the Court held that no constitutional rule 
required the court “to ‘instruct the jury on its obligation and authority to consider 
mitigating evidence, and on particular mitigating factors deemed relevant by the State.’”  
 
                                                 
3  The majority also asserts that “[t]here were no objections to the instructions, nor any 
suggestions for correction or additions.”  Maj. Op. at 9.  I cannot agree. Copenhefer’s 
counsel argued for an instruction regarding the significance of the stipulation.  When 
prompted by the trial court, Copenhefer’s counsel asserted: 
 
But it is a mitigating factor per se by the stipulation, it has 
been proven by that stipulation by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  In discussing the jury instructions yesterday, one of 
the things we said was if you find something by a 
preponderance of the evidence, you cannot ignore it, you 
cannot dismiss it.  And especially in light of this particular 
mitigating circumstance which is spelled out specifically in 
the Statute [sic], it is a mitigating circumstance which has 
been proven.  Now, they can again decide it’s not worth much 
weight, but they cannot ignore it. 
 
Appx., p. 004503 
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See Maj. Op. at 14 (quoting Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 275).  However, nothing in the 
Court’s opinion suggests that the jury ignored evidence of a mitigating factor or that the 
Supreme Court would have upheld the results of a penalty hearing that allowed jurors to 
arbitrarily ignore mitigation that had been established as a matter of law.  On the 
contrary, the Court explicitly declared “that the sentencer may not be precluded from 
considering, and may not refuse to consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating 
evidence.”  Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 276 (emphasis added). The Court rejected the 
defendant’s challenge to the jury charge in Buchanan precisely because the “jury 
instruction did not foreclose the jury’s consideration of any mitigating evidence” 522 
U.S. at 277,  but it is clear from the language I have just quoted that nothing on the record 
in Buchanan suggested that the jury simply refused to consider evidence of mitigation. 
I do not suggest that the jury here, in Buchanan or in any other case should 
attribute any particular weight to a mitigating fact that is proven.  However, it is clear that 
the Eighth Amendment does not tolerate a sentencing phase of a capital trial where jurors 
plainly ignore mitigating evidence.  As both the Court in Penry and majority in this case 
explain, “Eddings makes clear that it is not enough simply to allow the defendant to 
present mitigating evidence to the sentencer.  The sentencer must also be able to consider 
and give effect to that evidence in imposing [its] sentence.”  Maj. Op. at 15 (quoting 
Penry, 492 U.S. at 319).  
More specifically, in Penry, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
resolve two questions.  The question relevant to our inquiry was whether Penry:  
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was sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth Amendment because the 
jury was not adequately instructed to take into consideration all of his 
mitigating evidence and because the terms in the Texas special issues were 
not defined in such a way that the jury could consider and give effect to his 
mitigating evidence in answering them. 
 
492 U.S. at 313.  The Court found that the jury had been unable to give mitigating effect 
to evidence in imposing the sentence partly because the jury instructions failed to define 
“‘deliberately’ in a way that would clearly direct the jury to consider fully Penry’s 
mitigating evidence as it bears on his personal culpability.”  Id. at 323.  The Court held 
that a reasonable juror may have thought Penry acted “deliberately” because he 
confessed.  Id. at 322.  But the Court noted that 
 personal culpability is not solely a function of a defendant’s 
capacity to act ‘deliberately.’. . . Because Penry was mentally 
retarded, . . .  and thus less able than a normal adult to control 
his impulses or evaluate the consequences of his conduct, and 
because of his history of childhood abuse, that same juror 
could also conclude that Penry was less morally ‘culpable 
than defendants who have no such excuse,’ but who acted 
‘deliberately’ as that term is commonly understood. 
Id. at 322-3 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring)). 
For our purposes, it is important to note that the Court specifically stated that:  
it is not enough simply to allow the defendant to present 
mitigating evidence to the sentencer.  The sentencer must also 
be able to consider and give effect to that in imposing 
sentence. Only then can we can be sure that the sentencer has 
treated the defendant as a ‘uniquely individual human 
bein[g]’ and has made a reliable determination that death is 
the appropriate sentence. 
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Id. at 319 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-5 (1976)).  The Court 
concluded: “[i]n the absence of jury instructions defining ‘deliberately’ in a way that 
would clearly direct the jury to consider fully Penry’s mitigating evidence as it bears on 
his personal culpability, we cannot be sure that the jury was able to give effect to the 
mitigating evidence . . ..”.  Id. at 323. 
Thus, Penry recognizes that there are situations where the mere mention of 
“mitigating evidence” in a jury charge, or admitting evidence of mitigation, may not, by 
itself, be sufficient to guard against the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.  This is 
such a case.   
“Presentation of mitigating evidence alone, of course, does not guarantee that a 
jury will feel entitled to consider that evidence.” Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 384 
(1990).  As the Court explained in Penry: “the right to have the sentencer consider and 
weigh relevant mitigating evidence would be meaningless unless the sentencer was also 
permitted to give effect to its consideration’ in imposing [its] sentence.”  Penry, 492 U.S. 
at 321 (quoting Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 185,199 (1988)). 
III. 
My colleagues focus on the trial court’s repetition of the role that evidence of 
mitigation can play at the penalty phase of a capital trial.  The Majority appears to rely on 
the portions of the trial court’s instructions that told the jurors: (i) the jury “may consider 
as mitigating circumstances any circumstance [sic] which tends to justify the penalty of 
life imprisonment,” Maj. Op. at 9; (ii) the “list of mitigating circumstances offered cannot 
limit your deliberations, since you are free to consider any aspect of the crime or of the 
 10 
character of the defendant as mitigating in your sole discretion,” id. at 10; (iii) the jury 
may consider “any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of 
the defendant and the circumstances of the offense.”  Id. at 7. 
 The problem here is that (as the Majority quite correctly notes) we are bound by 
the jury’s pronouncement that it imposed the death penalty because no mitigating 
circumstances were proven.  See Maj. Op. at 13.  The jury could not have come to that 
conclusion without ignoring evidence of mitigation that was an uncontested part of the 
record.  I simply do not understand how we can be bound by the jury’s explanation of 
why it imposed the death penalty and conclude anything other than that evidence of 
mitigation was ignored.  The fact that there was obvious confusion when the verdict slip 
was handed to the judge does not allow us to spackle over the fact that the jury ignored 
evidence of a mitigating circumstance that the law required be considered and weighed 
against the aggravating circumstances.  On the contrary, we should be especially reticent 
to allow a death sentence to stand given the confusion that is so apparent on this record. 
 The exchange between the court and jury foreperson at the penalty phase is as 
revealing as it is troubling.   
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I’m reviewing the 
verdict slip that you have provided for me. Let me just double 
check something. I think that I find there is an inconsistency 
on this, and I’m going to have to ask you to take a moment to 
go back and reconsider this. I’m dealing specifically with part 
2 b, in which you must check off either one or two as it is 
applicable. You didn’t check off either one of them. I think I 
understand which one it is, I don’t know that it’s necessary 
for you to leave the jury box. I’m going to return this to you, 
to the foreman so that he can look at that, and determine—
and make a determination. Look carefully, if you feel that you 
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have to go back in the jury room, that will be perfectly fine. I 
would suggest before you do that, reread both one and two to 
make sure which one you’re checking off so you feel satisfied 
on that. 
 
(The verdict is handed to the foreman and returned 
back to the judge.) 
 
THE FOREMAN: From my understanding, that’s the 
way it should be, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: All right. Having checked off two, you 
crossed out the one part. 
 
THE FOREMAN: We had a list in there, Your Honor, 
I didn’t know whether we should also list those. 
 
THE COURT: Do I take it that should be in there 
then? 
 
THE FOREMAN: No, it should not. 
 
THE COURT: Well – 
 
THE FOREMAN: We had a list that we dealt with 
with [sic], if you would like us – 
 
THE COURT: I don’t want you to go into that. If you 
do not have two down there, then logically—and I don’t mean 
to suggest which is correct on this, but logically, you would 
be filling out number one, rather than two. 
 
Give that back to the foreman. 
 
(The verdict slip is returned to the foreman.) 
 
THE FOREMAN: You’re correct, Your Honor. 
Should I change it? 
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THE COURT: I would ask you then, if that is the case, 
whether you wish to consult with the other members of the 
jury or make the correction? 
 
THE FOREMAN: No, I think we understand. Yes, I 
can make the change. There would be no problem. 
 
THE COURT: All right. 
 
THE FOREMAN: Do you want me to change it on 
this? 
 
THE COURT: Yes.  Thank you. Now you may leave 
that with the foreman. 
 
Mr. Foreman, I understand from your submission of 
the verdict slip that you have reached a determination of 
sentence, is that correct? 
 
THE FOREMAN: Yes, we have, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: And what is that sentence? 
 
THE FOREMAN: Penalty of death. 
 
THE COURT: And on what basis? 
 
THE FOREMAN: On the basis of item number one, 
that there is at least one aggravating circumstance and 
mitigating—no mitigating circumstances. 
 
THE COURT: What did you find as the aggravating 
circumstance? 
 
THE FOREMAN: That the victim was held for 
ransom, that there was felony kidnapping, it was planned, and 
ultimately, the victim did die. 
 
THE COURT: Thank you. You may pick up the 
verdict slip. You may be seated, Mr. Foreman. 
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App., p. 4520-21 (emphasis added). 
The jury was then polled and the jurors unanimously agreed that there were no 
mitigating circumstances to be considered.4
 The Majority attempts to squeeze the genie back into the Buchanan bottle by 
assuming that the foreman simply made a mistake in crossing out “first offense” on the 
verdict form.  Maj. Op. at 10 (stating that“[t]he foreman crossed out ‘first offense,’ but 
mistakenly placed the check mark in the “weighing” box where, . . . it should not have 
been placed.”).  Such speculation would have merit had the foreman not explicitly stated 
that there were no mitigating factors, and the jury not unanimously agreed when polled 
immediately after hearing the foreman’s explanation for this sentence.  See supra at p. 12. 
I therefore have a hard time agreeing that the jury considered a fact no juror believed 
  Thus, I am not persuaded by the Majority’s 
reliance on a line of cases which hold that the Eighth Amendment is not violated as long 
as jurors are allowed to consider and give effect to any mitigating circumstance that any 
juror believes is established by a preponderance of the evidence.  Here, since the jury 
concluded that there were no mitigating circumstances, it is clear that the jurors ignored a 
mitigating circumstance that was established as a matter of  law, and had to be 
considered.  I can find no Supreme Court case upholding a death sentence under such 
circumstances. 
                                                 
4  For ease of reference, I have attached the verdict slip.  It is clear that whatever 
confusion existed regarding the verdict slip, ultimately, the changes made to the verdict 
slip reflect the pronouncement of the jury foreman (and that of each and every other 
juror) that no mitigating factor was found to exist but aggravating factors did exist and, 
therefore, death was mandatory. 
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existed.  My colleagues’ contrary view reduces the time-honored tradition of polling a 
jury to nothing more than a ritualistic callisthenic. 
We cannot both accept the jury’s explanation and ignore it too by speculating 
around it.  If we accept what the jury unanimously declared, as the Majority says we 
must, it is clear that the jury ignored constitutionally relevant evidence.  Moreover, even 
if we could ignore the record and breathe some ambiguity into what happened here,  any  
doubt must be resolved in favor of life, not death.  See Andres v. United States, 333 U.S. 
740, 752 (1948) (“In death cases doubts such as those presented here should be resolved 
in favor of the accused.”); Penry, 492 U.S. at 328 (“Our reasoning in Lockett and Eddings 
thus compels a remand for resentencing so that we do not risk that the death penalty will 
be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty.  When the choice 
is between life and death, that risk is unacceptable and incompatible with the commands 
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
When the instructions are read in their entirety, it is clear that jurors believed they 
were permitted to consider any evidence of mitigation only after that evidence had been 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence.  That is what the judge told them and there is 
certainly nothing wrong with that statement of the law.  However, the prosecutor had 
decided to argue that there was no evidence of mitigation and the jury was never 
instructed about the effect of the stipulation between Copenhefer and the 
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Commonwealth.5
 My colleagues attempt to rationalize this paradoxical penalty hearing by assuming 
that this jury would have imposed the death penalty anyway and merely did what it 
intended.  They reason that “the record strongly suggests that [the jury] considered the 
mitigating evidence and decided that none of that evidence was qualitatively sufficient to 
  Thus, the court’s failure to instruct on the significance of a stipulation 
allowed the jury to ignore evidence of mitigation under these circumstances. 
Our Eighth Amendment inquiry must focus on “whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood that [this] jury . . . applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevent[ed] 
the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.”  Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380.  This 
inquiry could not be easier because the jury said that it did precisely that.  Therefore, we 
should conclude that the instruction allowed the jury to ignore constitutionally relevant 
evidence that had been proven as a matter of law.  It did so by not informing the jury that 
the law regards a stipulated fact as proven after the prosecutor decided to argue the 
absence of any mitigation.  See id; Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 259 (2007) 
(“The jury must have a ‘meaningful basis to consider the relevant mitigating qualities’ of 
the defendant’s proffered evidence.”) (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 369 
(1993)).   
                                                 
5  Over Copenhefer’s objection, the trial court found that it could not compel the jury to 
find the stipulated fact as a mitigating factor though it admitted it would be problematic if 
the jury refused to find the existence of a mitigating factor based on the stipulation.  
Appx., p. 004504 (The Court:  “[T]he stipulation  does not mean that the jury must accept 
it.  I anticipate they will, of course, but I don’t think I can compel they accept it as being 
something that they must put down as a mitigating factor.  [Defense Counsel]:  That’s 
fine.  In fact, [if] the verdict of death comes back, and there’s an indication that they 
haven’t accepted that, then we have a whole new problem.  The Court:  Then we have a 
problem, I agree with you.”).   
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constitute a mitigating circumstance.”  Maj. Op. at 17.  However, there is a difference 
between deciding that evidence is not sufficient to constitute a mitigating circumstance 
and deciding that there is no evidence of mitigation. The distinction is far more than a 
linguistic complexity; it is a distinction with a constitutional difference.  
 My colleagues also believe that “it is difficult [to] imagine that the outcome of this 
case would have been different if the jury had been specifically instructed to find 
Copenhefer’s lack of a prior record was a mitigating circumstance.”  Id. at 18.  Perhaps, 
but the solemnity and finality of the death penalty should not afford the luxury of such 
harmless error speculation. “[W]e may not speculate as to whether the [sentencer] 
actually considered all of the mitigating factors and found them insufficient to offset the 
aggravating circumstances . . .. [Instead we are required to] remove any legitimate basis 
for finding ambiguity concerning the factors actually considered by the [sentencer].”  
Eddings, 455 U.S. at 119 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  The Majority’s speculation is 
particularly dangerous because it ignores the jury’s own explanation of its sentence.6
                                                 
6  This case is unlike Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 381 (1988).  There, the Court 
stated that “[t]here is, of course, no extrinsic evidence of what the jury in this case 
actually thought. . . .”  Here, the jury told the judge what it thought.  Since no mitigating 
factor existed, and there was evidence of several aggravating factors, the death sentence 
had to be imposed.  In Mills, the Court set a death sentence aside explaining: “Our 
reading of [the judge’s instruction and verdict form] leads us to conclude that there is at 
least a substantial risk that the jury was misinformed.”; see also Eddings, 455 U.S. at 119 
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  Here, that risk is a certainty. 
 
  
Moreover, the majority’s hypothesis is no more likely than the possibility that at least one 
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juror would have been unwilling to have Copenhefer killed for his first criminal offense 
no matter how wanton his conduct was.7
Unless we take it upon ourselves to completely ignore the verdict slip and the 
jury’s unanimous explanation for sentencing Copenhefer to be executed, we must 
conclude that the jury either ignored the jury instruction and refused to find evidence of 
mitigation despite the court’s charge, or that the jury accepted the charge but took it upon 
itself to ignore a proven fact that the law required be weighed in determining the 
sentence.  It does not matter which of these two possibilities occurred here because one is 
 
The majority’s hypothesis about what happened here is little more than restorative 
speculation that attempts to re-write this confused record.  However, despite the obvious 
confusion, some incontrovertible facts remain.  The prosecutor, after stipulating to the 
existence of a mitigating factor, argued that the defendant should be put to death because 
there were no mitigating factors “of merit” on the record; the trial court then sat by and 
refused to explain to the jury that one mitigating factor had been established as a matter 
of law – and was therefore “of merit” and had to be considered; instead, the trial court 
told the jurors that they must weigh any mitigating factors that were proven.  The jurors 
then imposed the death penalty based upon their unanimous conclusion that, contrary to 
stipulated evidence, no mitigating factors had been proven.   
                                                 
7  We must be confident that the trial court’s instruction did not “foreclose the jury’s 
consideration of any mitigating evidence.”  Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 277.  I can have no 
such confidence on this record.  It is one that should remind us all that “[e]volving 
standards of societal decency have imposed a correspondingly high requirement of 
reliability on the determination that death is the appropriate penalty in a particular case.”  
Mills, 486 U.S. at 384. 
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as arbitrary and constitutionally improper as the other.  As I stated at the outset, “[t]he 
sentencer may not refuse to consider . . . any relevant mitigating evidence.”  Eddings, 455 
U.S. at 114.   
IV. 
I do not want to conclude without acknowledging that it may well be that the jury 
imposed this sentence because the jurors wanted Copenhefer to pay for his crime with his 
own life, just as my colleagues speculate.  Given the circumstances here, the jury could 
certainly have reached that conclusion after properly considering all of the evidence of 
his guilt, the aggravated circumstances of his crime, and weighing them in a rational 
manner against the evidence of mitigation.  However, the Eighth Amendment does not 
allow a jury to ignore evidence of mitigation and sentence someone to death just because 
the jury thinks that he deserves to die.  Yet, according to the record, that is what 
happened here.  In upholding the death penalty on this record, we are not only assuming 
the role of the circus hand who walks behind the elephant with a shovel, we are 
establishing precedent that will surely undermine the very significant legal protections 
that polling the jury is supposed to afford the accused.8
Imposing the death sentence without considering evidence of mitigation is 
precisely the arbitrary result the Eighth Amendment guarantees against.  See Mills, 486 
U.S. at 375 (“[F]ailure to consider all of the mitigating evidence risks erroneous 
imposition of the death sentence, in plain violation of Lockett . . . .”) (internal citations 
 
                                                 
8  See United States v. Gibbs, 813 F.2d 596, 603(3rd Cir. 1986) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) 
(alluding to the court being “the circus hand following the . . . elephant around the 
sawdust trail.”). 
 19 
omitted).  The jury charge that was given would not have resulted in an unconstitutional 
sentence if the jury concluded that there was evidence of mitigation but then proceeded to 
give it insufficient weight to counterbalance the aggravating factors of the crime.  See 
Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15 (“The sentencer . . .  may determine the weight to be given 
relevant mitigating evidence.  But [the sentencer] may not give it no weight by excluding 
such evidence from [its] consideration.”).  However, that is not what the jury said it did; 
we cannot change that.  
V. CONCLUSION. 
In arguing that this death sentence cannot be supported on this record I do not, of 
course, ignore or minimize the barbarity of Copenhefer’s crime or the overwhelming 
evidence of his guilt.  Much has been said and written about the dangers of executing an 
innocent defendant; this is not such a case.  Having served on this court for nearly 20 
years, and having presided over hundreds of homicide trials as a state trial judge for more 
than 10 years - 3 of which consisted of nothing but homicide trials -  I can truthfully say 
that I cannot recall a case where the evidence against a defendant was stronger than the 
evidence the Commonwealth marshaled against Copenhefer.  He is clearly guilty; but, of 
course, that is not the issue in this case. 
It is precisely those crimes that most disgust us that most require we remain 
vigilant in deciding issues that arise under the Eighth Amendment’s protection against 
arbitrary punishment.  Those are the crimes that pose the greatest danger that jurors will 
allow reason to be supplanted by passion.  “Arbitrary” sentences also include sentences 
imposed in violation of the law, and that is what the Eighth Amendment prohibits.  
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Because it is clear that the sentencing here was in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s 
guarantee against the arbitrary imposition of the death penalty, we should affirm the 
District Court’s order vacating this death sentence.  See Mills, 486 U.S. at 384.  
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